

C-II

It was luck
that

a) - JFK "won"

↳ because of

b) the ~~Baron~~ ^{Baron}

was not expected

(a lot more like
the others - fig.

books

with VER not K
believed there could
be even

"Because A won't
let that happen"

(it takes 2;
each has a veto

on war; ^{possibly}

He will beat down;
or if not - if he doesn't,

A will.

[BUT: will events - and

by suggestions, rivals,
and by our impulses
in the court

allow her to?"

[Will A (VGR) —
be able/willing to
interview for VA
in 1965? (forced
into default)]

Good over-estimate

of his own control
over (his country's)
action

his allies' actions

and opponents' control
over his and
his allies' actions!

[R/IVN; NVN/ TG
central command,
Phien; ...

(550/ Nguyen cat cat)

MOA: non-negotiable

(in '64) ORV delegated
to central command.

or families...

TCs... that he would
deploy warheads, or
delegates...

he connects central
control [as to an
SAC...]

(VCS/WNT - search +
deletes...

Days of Ibsen
— control...

PROBS
+ C-II

1)

What did JFK
expect?

asked on his
own decisions
on K decisions

2) What did other
expect (7 knew)?

BR ✓ see differences
+ own time

3) How Negotiations
over the
estrates?

4) What did the
cavies reveal
about the
values? Proving
convictions?

5) What can we learn
about others?
(measures, FW)

values ?

estimates ?

Real Notes ?

errors ?

behavior in crises



Went with was JFK
willing to take ?

(small - as he
estimated (it was
much higher - he
underestimated
actual risk, in

being willing to
take some risk

willingness to lose -
+ submits

Over-est of

1) his own resources

2) his ability to

control his subordinates

or allies

or data resources

(control then, of
themselves, warnings)

(see CBS/MCN in 1965)

Coagins of
purps
SC - to use
two ones

JCS - to attack
(are missiles...)?

- to launch SIOP
if ...

- "K wait..."

- JFK can wait until
better, ...! (Possible?)

SU
- Failure to
control areas
("Cuba")

Was President
ready to authorize
two areas of interest?

(Coster: prompt
next morning)

(later / before
using two areas
if he had IRBMs!
(if he could have
but, with MRBMs?)

VFR committed
to VCS:

We commit.

(coming out threats:

perhaps that seems

K...

VFR bluff -

moment - because

it won't be out

of a bluff as he

thought: Carter could
have enforced it -

C-II

10-14-11

History:

On Oct 15,
Book + Ridge Book
Turkey in mail -

"We'll have to
eat it."

JFK didn't - it
must go."

(JFK not clear
about Turkey - "5 years
ago." Although he
wouldn't eat. ^{admission} RFK

(RFE + Vienna)

(Qui Nam
Plinten)

not "glass
door" (Henthoff)

Joe was in
Cuba were not
for detainer—
they were for
defending
Law troops (Henthoff)
Hibbs

(Parker: was all
bluff) (since '62?)
N? re: top

10-15-11

C-II

18 SAM had shot
down U-2 on
Oct 14

(as NRO
learned - from
JAOs?)

Kwinn!

If K had ~~expected~~
stayed with
Oct 27 way -
(as JFK/REC
expected)

- JFK had a time
limit, just like
K - ~~Chad~~

(Custom AA continues
to fire - even if it
doesn't hit
JCS down by attack.)

the prospects
of K even
going in?
to PC, etc.

Those who
thought be would
tight blockade
didn't know
of Russ play

Prospects

Notes

TR:- get York,
Linnou

-Hartbuff
Buckings,
on 1961

Hartbuff (Oct, for Oct
379

K didn't know
what balance
to Centro

~~F~~10? ICBM's

US? in Oct '62

10-4-11

[In '69, with
RFR "13 Days"
(and his "2nd warning")
did outbursts
known that Emberson
AA was not
controlled of K?
When was that
known?)

in the mountain
every and Stamp (!)
+ Taylor.

(Nitzo, Dallas, Taylor,
McCom, (Mc6? other 2?)

PRK. "If 6 had been finished -
now."

Went to business?

significant - but only 40
some they know?

LESSON: Manuals designs of
are over (and big, long, over)
and greater than "they" know!
(Saying "wintered" - LIKE US!

(Bent, Wright, McN,
conducting various Reu
Reu, long VN are
would fight!

See Castro, will to
fight (vs. Wander, ...)

not (will - / or Castro /
(No!)

machines to "occupy"
anything (+ refuting) cas.
is are war!

(Not JFK, K, McGB..

(Always use G.T.
as "one more crisis"
threatening
"destruction" of Cuba!
"Oct. Crisis.")

(Soviet + Russian D-2)

C-15

- If the head converged
(see refs on this)
- If K had reversed
(He and a local "...
detention!")
~~the~~ ~~the~~
- [If he had been open?
If the head was live!]
- [Could VOR power
improve for thumb?]
- If no shooting on Oct 27?

(H) K could have

guaranteed JFK &

himself - no shooting

on Oct 28 - and

Normal Turkey

privately

(to USCIB??!)

said that was at

5 PM Moscow,

(9 AM DC -

de vivo

K sees VFK walking
toward an
unmarked
min-field
tipping D.M.
(use wear)

Neen → AA →
attack on SAMs/MRBMs
(ends fairly well)
→ invasion → two
waves → US waves on
SU troops in Cuba and
on SU → Europe, also
west

(couldn't the
low altitude or
Europe come
are written in
1962?!

10, 2 D.V. is
already,

before 1966-68-
70

chain of are written
just up after NPT:

MIRV

[testing NOW \rightarrow MIRV \xrightarrow{DHs}

100 men in Colo
in 1962!

(Costs - armed
man?)

Every armed is

hissed, inexplicable

(except Chin?)

C-I

SDM - not
only not under
IC controls

not under Phyics
control - final
opamt orders
{ intent Phyics
{ Regasadi - radon
control? did they
half see a burst
in clouds?)

C-II

They acted as
if criteria goals/

A rather than B

"Not working down"

talk to

11-3-11

Jim Douglas
Colbalt

Karim - VN ROBEL

Dobbs - C-II?

Hendley (Benet)

Sergei K. Kuroshin

Mikoyan Viktor

Arbatov, etc.

Sum. Sec.

PUTIN!

POS - are dangerous

Critiques of Douglas
Colbalt

Alperin

(Kruglik / Stone :

✓ SCHEER / Hawk / Mayor

PDS hyp?
10-28-11

Hawkins in SU and
US collaborated (?)
on getting SU
moving into Cuba
to discredit &
move back
K and JFK

(x rail: 0)

JFK — from Pres. after.

not an attack

NO invasion

but: blockade

readiness

to get committed

Trade :

Cast, Havana

Italy?

Berlin

Britain

all US out of
Turkey; please

Blight w. Hensley -
"On Oct 16, they
don't talk about
various moderns."

- No - they don't talk
about Mr. Maguire,
either! "

+ see his about
plans - re Maguire
→ various. (prowe-
ction; Northwoods
("as intend to visit"

Hyp: JAKs from
drawing of minutes
- mission is cut
(purport in
attack? But if it
doesn't get all...

(actually, on an attack
before Oct 23 would have
But - proof there
were minutes?!

included workbooks -
no way to know that...

"Was IC willing
to take a high
risk?"

(BB - so what?)

Actually, not
but he said
risk as low!

It wasn't "center";
but it was high!

(after several messages?)
SAM thoroughly under but
the risk as high!

C-II

Not knowing of
Meyerson or invasion,
I misunderstood
what led to C-II
("VFC weakness"
- "demios")

(Note: K didn't
think VFC was so
weak he would let
K send overtures
openly!) (& next's fear)
and demios, fear of
weakness in VN - demios...

Nov 11

50 after C-II

Savo didn't read —
and couldn't see —
a credible FS force
(as US had until
1963-64)

By ^{which} could ~~see~~ —
but not read —
a "not-credible,
delusional FS force"
like US after 1965

They went and to
thinks FC was
a US ally —

(~~the~~ except for
Cuba — they said
that, but kept it
secret, as thinks!)

Now, went and
to thinks "having the
bird" on ES.

Walt by himself
- at dinner hour in
6-162

was a credible
Walt / several - sticks
from

he advised those
persons:

(B's) were wholly
credible & dangerous

1
2
3

(low mil.

Cont of S-B?)

SW D.M.

Crises

Nov 2

11

DS scandal out:
Will this make him
feel humiliated —
or attacked, very
angry?

Will it expose him
to danger of losing
office, power?

embarrass him before
his friends, his dems, audience?
Ihn — expect the

uncharacteristically
bald, violent,
(illegal...)

action

to avert loss
or to revenge
(even-then)...

(pay/risk in order
to harm or humiliate

Fls. 2

"More New Evidence"

Shedding

✓ Anatomy of a Crisis

✓ - Men on Baby & the C-4
Ment Krown

✓ The 'Persons' of C-4
for Wounded Part Here

Also

- Fore New Wpus,

Sanit Commend Anting

+ C-4

Li